The Nation of the Westernizers: Mainstream and Minority Varieties of Romanian Liberalism by Rizescu, Victor
www.ssoar.info
The Nation of the Westernizers: Mainstream and
Minority Varieties of Romanian Liberalism
Rizescu, Victor
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rizescu, V. (2013). The Nation of the Westernizers: Mainstream and Minority Varieties of Romanian Liberalism.
Revista Istorică, 24(5-6), 405-426. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-74085-3
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Free Digital Peer Publishing Licence




This document is made available under a Free Digital Peer
Publishing Licence. For more Information see:
http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/
 
„Revista istorică”, tom XXIV, 2013, nr. 5–6, p. 405–425 
CURENTE ŞI IDEI POLITICE 
THE NATION OF THE WESTERNIZERS: MAINSTREAM AND 
MINORITY VARIETIES OF ROMANIAN LIBERALISM 
VICTOR RIZESCU* 
Between 1900 and 1940, westernizer liberalism embraced, in Romania, three 
ideological formulations clearly distinguishable from each other. They can be 
discovered as crisscrossing in the pages of three periodicals. Published over the 
year 1923, from January to November – and significantly focused on debating the 
preparation and reverberations of the constitutional revision adopted in the same 
year, in March –, the journal “Dreptatea socială” was underlined by a “liberal 
socialist” vision that sociologist Dumitru Drăghicescu (acting as a director) offered 
as an elaboration of his broader social philosophy shaped at the interplay between 
the European social-democratic tradition and his core Durkheimian ideas. This 
view is much too easy to be mistaken for the one that it (strangely) cohabitates with 
in the pages of the same journal: the argumentation in favor of enhancing the 
interventionist cast of the local mainstream liberalism advanced by Ştefan Zeletin, 
in conjunction with his open acknowledgement of the oligarchic and bureaucratic 
nature of the policies customarily employed by the National Liberal Party as a 
privileged driving force of modernizing social change.  
Between January 1933 and December 1937 – and decreasingly so over the 
following years, up to December 1940 –, the journal “Libertatea economică, 
politică, socială, culturală” (headed by economist George Strat as a chief-editor and 
by industrialist Ion Gigurtu as a director) advanced a vision of free trade liberalism 
in stark opposition to the same mainstream and deeply entrenched interventionist 
wisdom in the course of being strengthened by the rising authoritarian ideologies of 
the Left and the Right. The few statements that Drăghicescu gave here spelled out 
his disagreements with the unqualified individualist philosophy of the journal, 
nevertheless maintaining a line markedly different from the Zeletinian one.  
In its turn, “Libertatea”’s stance – prodigiously served by journalist Ştefan 
Antim (with a legal training) and occasionally also by the elder H. Sanielevici (an 
influential, although always marginalized figure of literary criticism as well as of 
broader topics of journalistic interest) – was anticipated by that of another 
periodical: “Curentul nou,” with Sanielevici as a director and issued first in 1905–
1906, and then again in 1920 (this second time with Antim as a main collaborator). 
Expressions of the standard view calling for a statist-based adjustment of the liberal 
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ideas sometimes featured in the last journal, in cohabitation with its growing 
intimation of the need for a return to classical liberalism. The three Romanian 
interpretations of liberalism are considered in the following, by having recourse to 




The doctrine of liberal socialism is consistently elaborated, in the pages of 
“Dreptatea socială,” by Drăghicescu alone, in continuation to his political tracts of 
the previous two years.1 The opening article entitled What do we want? (unsigned, 
but undeniably his) thus advocates a program meant to strike and broaden a wise 
middle road between liberalism and socialism, stating that “in order not to 
degenerate into abusive practices, into fraud and unchecked competition, the 
principle of liberty has to function only in conjunction with that of justice, in the 
same way as justice itself can go along without liberty, as the socialists want, only 
at the cost of relapsing into the most odious tyranny.”2 This statement can only be 
made after acknowledging that a significant part of the socialist view has 
established itself as the horizon of any meaningful policy of social reform, to the 
extent that “the socialist movement shows itself, nowadays, as impetuous as the 
liberal one was in 1848, and its chances to succeed seem to be also much the 
same.”3 Hence, “the principle of social justice” promoted by the new periodical 
must not be perceived as a challenging minority opinion, but as “underlying the 
aspirations of the entire Romanian politics.” The publishing enterprise inaugurated 
can only have the function to act as a vehicle for bringing to full light such diffuse 
ideals and unclear expectations, thus “defining and clarifying the principle in 
question and scrutinizing its many practical implications.”4 
While thus making plain its closeness to socialist politics, the new doctrine 
nevertheless underscores its pacifist edge. It is meant to lessen social tensions and 
class warfare, in the same way as it is dedicated to preventing war “between 
peoples and states.” Indeed, “while customary political activity inflames the state 
of conflict as to transform it into social warfare, the morality of social justice 
requires that conflicts are prevented by the means of arbitration.”5 This task can 
only be approached by reworking the notion of “property,” which stays at the very 
core of the liberal socialist endeavors: “Because the issue of property stays as the 
very foundation and regulatory principle of the relations between classes, it is only 
                                                 
1 D. Drăghicescu, Evoluţia ideilor liberale, Bucharest, 1921; idem, Partide politice şi clase 
sociale, Bucharest, 1922. 
2 Ce voim?, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 15 January 1923, no. 1, p. 5. 
3 Ibidem, p. 4. 
4 Ibidem, p. 6. 
5 D. Drăghicescu, Dreptate şi dreptate socială, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 15 January 1923, 
no. 1, p. 10.  
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natural that we start by focusing on its understandings. The way property is 
acquired, used and transmitted must be the first object of our inquiries.”6 In their 
turn, such inquiries can only start from acknowledging that the redefinition of 
property is currently underway, due to the inescapable process by which economic 
production is gradually socialized: “Industrial property is already collectivized and 
socialized. This is because the form of the shareholding company adopted, 
especially after the war, by most of industrial and commercial enterprises, is in fact 
a collective or social form of property.”7  
Having said this, however, a genuine vision of social justice must act such as 
to prevent the development of this process of socialization into the full 
nationalization of economic life envisioned by Marxist socialism: “Property of 
whatever kind has to be warranted, because its existence is a requirement for social 
peace.”8 Recent historical experience has “disavowed socialist theories, showing 
how wrong their expectations of forced socialization, by the expropriation of the 
expropriators, actually were.”9 It has also shed a revealing light on the “incapacity 
of the bureaucratic state to act efficiently in the economic field, together with its 
ingrained tendency to shift the deficits incurred by state-managed enterprises on 
the shoulders of the tax payers.”10 It is on these grounds that “liberal socialism […] 
must militate for an association between individual and state interests, within state-
controlled enterprises. […] Liberal socialism rules out the tyranny of state 
management, which, besides oppressing the individual and individual initiative, 
leads to stagnation or even decline.”11 Accordingly, “the objectives of socialization 
and nationalization must be approached gradually, by taking account of the types 
of enterprises and of the various factors of production involved.”12 They can most 
appropriately be attained in the framework of the “autonomous socialized 
enterprises,” conceived by Drăghicescu to allow for the employees to act as 
co-proprietors and co-administrators, together with the state13 (provided that the 
state itself abandons its bureaucratic, centralized and militarized character, in so far 
as, when adopting an “economic function,” it will have to “create an organization 
                                                 
6 Ibidem, p. 11. 
7 Idem, Noţiunea proprietăţii şi formele ei, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 15 February 1923, no. 3, 
p. 70.  
8 Idem, Dreptul de proprietate şi pacea socială, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 1 March 1923, no. 4, 
p. 109. 
9 Idem, Proprietatea şi marile întreprinderi. Societăţile anonime, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 
1 April 1923, no. 6, p. 168. 
10 Idem, Regimul proprietăţii şi întreprinderile mari. Socializarea şi regia de stat, in 
“Dreptatea socială,” 1, 1 March 1923, no. 4, p. 202. 
11 Idem, Burghezia şi socialismul liberal, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 15 February 1923, no. 3, 
p. 95. 
12 Idem, Regimul proprietăţii şi întreprinderile mari, p. 200. 
13 Idem, Naţionalizarea întreprinderilor mari. Regia socială independentă, in “Dreptatea 
socială,” 1, 15 May 1923, no. 9, pp. 266–274. 
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suited to its new role”14). It is only by such doing that the task of reworking the 
bases of property as to place them in accordance with the requirements of social 
justice can be accomplished: “By […] various policies, including progressive 
taxation, nationalization, expropriation and confiscations, the fortunes amassed in 
great quantities by whatever means […] will be lowered down to levels legitimate 
from the standpoint of social equity. It is only in this way that right and rational 
relations between capitals and the demands of social justice can be obtained. In 
other words, it is only under these conditions that the contradiction between capital 
and the principle of justice can be solved.”15 
Drăghicescu’s perception of the core socialist program as tacitly subscribed 
to, at the beginning of the 1920’s, by virtually all the segments of Romanian 
political and ideological life emerges retrospectively as starkly incongruent with 
the realities of a chronically marginal and electorally insignificant social-
democratic movement,16 of a communist trend rapidly wiped out as a factor of 
political significance – in another way than in the guise of a small clandestine 
group17 – and of a peasantist current always vacillating over its vision of class 
conflict as it related to the peculiar class structure of the country.18 Although the 
calls for social pacification and harmonization professed by “Dreptatea socială” 
were, otherwise, very common in the local cultural and ideological milieu,19 the 
doctrine of liberal socialism had overtones hard to be discovered as part of other – 
and more influential – ideological traditions. 
Its counterparts in other European countries are easy to identify, however. Most 
closely reminiscent of it was definitely the view developed under the same 
ideological label in Italy by Carlo Rosselli, emerging to the same extent as that of 
Drăghicescu as a result of a gradual disentanglement from social-democracy by a 
way back to liberal rule of law principles (and eventually used by the same political 
thinker as a support for his opposition to fascism).20 Of still greater significance was 
the entire welter of ideas pointing to a broadening of liberalism towards embracing 
                                                 
14 Ibidem, p. 267.  
15 Idem, Proprietatea (capitalul) şi dreptatea socială. Cum se câştigă averile?, in “Dreptatea 
socială,” 1, 1–15 July 1923, nos. 12–13, pp. 367–368. 
16 Henry L. Roberts, Rumania. Political Problems of an Agrarian State, Hamden, Conn., 1969 
[1951], pp. 243–258. 
17 Lucien Karchmar, Communism in Romania, 1918–1921, in The Effects of World War I. The 
Class War after the Great War: The Rise of Communist Parties in East Central Europe 1918–1921, 
ed. by Ivo Banac, Boulder, Colo., 1983, pp. 127–187. 
18 Z. Ornea, Ţărănismul. Studiu sociologic, Bucharest, 1969; George D. Jackson, Peasant 
Political Movements in Eastern Europe, in Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change, ed. 
by Henry A. Landsberger, London, 1974, pp. 259–315. 
19 See, for example, Z. Ornea, Sămănătorismul, Bucharest, 1998 [1970], pp. 134–140; 
Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, Concepţia conservatoare şi progresul, in Doctrinele partidelor politice, 
ed. by Petre Dan, Bucharest, n.d. [1996 (1923)], pp. 64–90. 
20 Stanislao G. Pugliese, Carlo Rosselli: Socialist Heretic and Anti-Fascist Exile, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1999. 
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social concerns, originated already in the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
establishing itself as dominant within the liberal camp during the opening decades of 
the twentieth. Shaped at the interplay between political theory and sociological 
inquiry – and accordingly elaborated by the means of a sustained dialogue between 
political philosophers and the representatives of the discipline of sociology, in the 
course of being entrenched as a separate academic compartment21 – the “new 
liberalism” drew on various philosophical premises, stretching from positivism, 
through neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism, to Orthodox Christianity. In Italy 
itself, Rosselli’s concerns were shared by theorists as different as the elite sociologist 
Vilfredo Pareto and the neo-Hegelian philosopher (and idealist historian) Benedetto 
Croce,22 that formed part of a cross-European intellectual movement. Best 
represented in Britain – where it was developed by T.H. Green, J.A. Hobson and L.T. 
Hobhouse, in continuation to the radical thrust of John Stuart Mill’s thinking,23 the 
same enterprise of ideological refashioning could resonate, in France, with the local 
republican tradition, broadened on neo-Kantian bases by Charles Renouvier and 
translated into the idiom of “solidarism” by Léon Bourgeois.24 The politics of 
Durkheim, issuing from its sociological understanding of the disruptive and 
atomizing effects that modernization had on the social bounds, belonged to the same 
company,25 to the same extent that, in Germany, Max Weber’s sociological 
conception was intimately connected with his urge for the adaptation of liberal 
constitutionalist practices to the requirements of heavy bureaucratization and 
accomplished rationalization prevalent in modern society.26 In Russia, a “new 
liberal” trend of thought, emerging, with Vladimir Soloviev, from within the 
Slavophile tradition, turned to adopting neo-Kantian premises and evolved towards a 
liberal socialist stance in the works of Leon Petrażycki, Pavel Novgorodtsev and 
Bogdan Kistiakovsky, in order to move afterwards to the position of “rule of law 
socialism” with Sergius Hessen.27 
Five of the articles contributed by Ştefan Zeletin to “Dreptatea socială” were 
retained by him in the volume Neoliberalism of 1927,28 and it is undeniable that they 
                                                 
21 Anthony Giddens, Classical Social Theory and the Origins of Modern Sociology, in “The 
American Journal of Sociology,” 81, 1976, no. 4, pp. 703–729. See also H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness 
and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930, New York, 1976 [1958]. 
22 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society. A Historical Argument, University Park, 
Penns., 1992, pp. 121–156. 
23 Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism. An Ideology of Social Reform, Oxford, 1978; 
R. Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, pp. 9–57.  
24 R. Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, pp. 58–74; Michael Freeden, The Coming of 
the Welfare State, in The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought, ed. by Terence 
Ball, Richard Bellamy, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 30–35. 
25 R. Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, pp. 74–104. 
26 Ibidem, pp. 165–216. 
27 Andrzej Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, Notre Dame, Ind., 1992 [1987], 
pp. 165–465. 
28 Ştefan Zeletin, Pseudoburghezie, Finanţă şi antisemitism, Forţă şi constituţie, Politica muncii, 
Naţionalismul. Un nume pentru două atitudini opuse faţă de evoluţia socială, all in Neoliberalismul. 
Studii asupra istoriei şi politicii burgheziei române, ed. by C.D. Zeletin, Bucharest, 1992 [1927]. 
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have to be seen as an integral part of his sophisticated refashioning of the Romanian 
tradition of economic protectionism, thus transformed into a wide-ranging political 
rationalization of oligarchic modernizing liberalism with a strong nationalist 
commitment (best embodied historically by the National Liberal Party but envisioned 
by him to get an even better incarnation in the People’s Party). Although 
occasionally paying homage, conveniently, to the master-discourse of the journal – 
as for example when designating it as “‘neoliberalism’ or ‘liberal socialism’,”29 
Zeletin nevertheless proceeds undisturbed with an argumentation strikingly, but 
undeniably at odds with that advanced by the director of the publication. Stretching 
through it is the vision that – even when proven as a spoliator of the whole society by 
the standards of usual morality30 – the reigning financial oligarchy – denounced as 
such from all corners of the public opinion and emerged from within the bureaucratic 
class ruling over Romanian society over the preceding period, up to the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War31 – has to be accepted as a most necessary evil and 
a benefactor to the national interests over the long run. When enriching itself, even at 
the cost of employing state levers to serve its own narrow interests, the plutocracy 
works for the betterment of the whole society. This is because, “as long as the class 
division of society prevails, national prosperity hinges on the prosperity of the ruling 
class and national ruin comes from the ruin of that same class.”32  
Advancing this idea in order to face the criticisms leveled by the left-wing 
newspaper “Adevărul” against the project of constitutional revision engineered by 
the National Liberal Party, Zeletin discovers the oligarchic behavior – usually 
blamed on that political force in a privileged fashion – as a pervasive temptation 
arising from deep social demands, to which opposition parties very easily succumb: 
“Economic evolution in modern Romania has inescapably led to the strengthening 
of the financial oligarchy, and our entire politics is predicated on this reality. Our 
self-styled democratic parties, that claim to fight against the oligarchy, tend to 
become themselves parts of the same financial oligarchy. Indeed, this is just the 
natural consequence of our entire social evolution.”33 Playing, as usually, on his 
ingenious comparisons between (delayed) Romanian and (pioneering) western 
stages of evolution and social forms, Zeletin manages to legitimize the 
intermingling – through blatant corruption practices – between bourgeois financial 
greed and state power as part and parcel of the record of social and economic 
development, reminiscent of the alliance between the nascent bourgeoisie and 
                                                 
29 Idem, Liberalism, neoliberalism şi socialism de stat, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 1 May 1923, 
no. 8, p. 235.  
30 Idem, “Acumularea primitivă” în România [1922], in Neoliberalismul, ed. by C.D. Zeletin, 
pp. 135–141. 
31 Idem, Burghezia română. Originea şi rolul ei istoric, ed. by C.D. Zeletin, Bucharest, 1991 
[1925], pp. 163–194. 
32 Idem, Finanţa naţională şi politica de stat (Răspuns profesiei de credinţă a ziarului 
“Adevărul”), in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 15 April 1923, no. 7, p. 216. 
33 Ibidem, p. 218. 
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absolutist monarchies in the old regime societies of the West: “As nowadays we 
live under a democratic parliamentary regime, capitalism cannot confine itself to 
obtain on its behalf the favors of the monarch alone, as it used to do in the past. It 
must have its voice heard in the democratic factory of legislation as well. It is to 
this extent that the most prominent political figures are driven into the 
administration bodies of the economic enterprises. We can encounter there, for 
sure, former ministers and prime ministers of great public influence, whose word is 
an order for a large parliamentary gallery. They are, as already said, the political 
agents of the financial bourgeoisie: they have to obtain all the legal provisions 
needed to further the pursuit of capitalist interests.”34 Just several days before the 
adoption of the constitutional revision in the parliament by a substantial Liberal 
Party majority and in the midst of a sustained public contestation of the same piece 
of legislation, Zeletin is eager to depict the constitutional document itself as the 
result of such bargaining between the political class and its economic counterpart: 
“It is undeniable that the actual constitutional project is fashioned on the basis of 
financial capitalist interests. But our countrymen refuse to accept this idea. How is 
it possible, they say, that a handful of people – or an oligarchy – rule over the 
country in a quasi-absolutist manner, imposing on it even the fundamental law? We 
can only answer that this is not only possible, but even natural. In such historic 
moments, when all the other classes fall into darkness, allowing only one of them 
to act effectively, the interests of this last class are one and the same with those of 
the nation as a whole, and its aspirations are undistinguishable from those of the 
entire nation.”35 
Although sometimes pointing to financial cartels as possible coordinating 
agencies for his envisioned design – otherwise marked by deep decentralization – 
intent on broadening the scope of social justice by the means of a combination 
between state management and individual economic initiative,36 Drăghicescu has 
as his main objective the entrenchment of welfare policies in conjunction with 
greater democratization (as a stark advocate for universal suffrage, he conceives of 
it in a developmentalist way, as a vehicle for the maturation of social conscience37). 
Zeletin, instead, spares no time to present low-class suffering as a requirement for 
national consolidation, which can only be obtained by compliance with the 
oligarchic leadership of modernizing change. While the former thinker speaks as a 
disappointed socialist who came to appreciate at full value the relevance of 
individual freedom,38 the latter makes the case for enhanced authoritarianism, 
                                                 
34 Ibidem, p. 213.  
35 Idem, Forţă şi constituţie, in “Dreptatea socială,” 1, 15 March 1923, no. 5, p. 137. 
36 D. Drăghicescu, Finanţa şi coordonarea marilor întreprinderi (creditul industrial), in 
“Dreptatea socială,” 1, 1 June 1923, no. 10, pp. 296–301. 
37 Idem, Reforma electorală. Discurs rostit la Senat în şedinţa de la 15 decembrie 1925, 
Bucharest, 1926. Compare, for example, G. Panu, Sufragiul universal, Bucharest, 1893.  
38 D. Drăghicescu, Idealul creator. Eseu psiho-sociologic asupra evoluţiei sociale, ed. by 
Virgiliu Constantinescu-Galiceni, Bucharest, 2005 [1914]. 
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semi-parliamentarianism and openly displayed economic interventionism with an 
oligarchic cast only to offer, as a compensation, his reassuring prospect that a form 
of mild socialism imposed top-down, without any recourse to revolutionary 
upheavals, stays as the inescapable fate of the entire capitalist world of which 
Romania is a part.39 The difference is stark and undeniable.  
Articles 17–21 of the constitutional document adopted in March provided for 
an understanding of property as based on the notion of “social utility,”40 and there 
has always been a tendency to briefly mention Zeletin and Drăghicescu as parts of 
a “neoliberal” quasi-consensus making for this result.41 The interwar constitution 
was harshly criticized on account of its loopholes allowing for further authoritarian 
evolutions.42 It is hard to look at Drăghicescu as to an inspiration for such political 
faults of the 1920’s and the 1930’s. The responsibilities in the field of Zeletin can 




Mainstream Romanian liberalism could be classified as a peripheral variety – 
with a corresponding focus on bureaucratic interests – of the late nineteenth 
century “sectarian liberalism,” functioning as a narrow minded ideology of the 
(upper) bourgeoisie, after basic liberal values had been institutionally and socially 
entrenched, coming to be adopted quasi-consensually by all parts of the political 
spectrum.43 The incongruence between the pleading for Manchesterian-style free 
trade principles advanced by this dominant liberal discourse and the blatant 
realities of a growing monopolist economy increasingly controlled by banking 
cartels and indebted to state-driven policies of imperialist expansion contributed 
heavily to the rise of the socially-minded – and basically left-wing – “new liberal” 
view, by way of reaction.44 To the same extent, Zeletin’s expectation of oligarchic-
induced socialism – argued primarily by reference to the dissident socialist 
conception of Werner Sombart and to Rudolf Hilferding’s Austro-Marxist analysis 
of finance capitalism – strongly recalls the main tenets of the German “socialism of 
the chair” (connected with the same “sectarian” bourgeois interests) and of the 
Russian “legal Marxist” school45 (that yielded, in the case of its most conspicuous 
                                                 
39 Ştefan Zeletin, Neoliberalismul [1926], in Neoliberalismul, ed. by C.D. Zeletin, pp. 83–100. 
40 See the collective volume Constituţia din 1923 în dezbaterea contemporanilor, Bucharest, 
1990 [Noua constituţie a României, 1923], pp. 613–614. 
41 M. Rusenescu, I. Saizu, Viaţa politică în România, 1922–1928, Bucharest, 1979, pp. 27–29; Mircea 
Muşat, Ion Ardeleanu, România după Marea Unire, vol. 1, 1918–1933, Bucharest, 1986, pp. 55–70. 
42 H.L. Roberts, Rumania, pp. 97–99. 
43 Victoria F. Brown, The Adaptation of a Western Political Theory in a Peripheral State: The 
Case of Romanian Liberalism, in Romania between East and West, ed. by Stephen Fischer-Galati et 
al., Boulder, Colo., 1982, pp. 269–301. 
44 R. Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, pp. 3–4. 
45 Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, New York, Norton, 2005 [1978], pp. 435, 
646–655. 
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representative, Peter Struve, to a political redefinition leading him from social-
democracy, through left-wing liberalism, to a liberal conservative position46). 
Beyond such particular connections, the type of liberal practices ideologically 
reinforced by Zeletin was a general rule all throughout the (sub)regions of Eastern, 
(Est-)Central and South-Eastern Europe, no matter whether modernizing policies 
strongly committed to nation-building and accelerated social change acted under a 
liberal banner or otherwise.47 Liberal discourse itself was most instrumental to 
propel policies of modernization of the sort over the long run in such countries as 
Greece,48 Hungary49 or Romania.50 It also acted as an original impulse for the same 
kind of policies in Serbia and Bulgaria, where it lost ground, later on, to other 
discourses eager to emphasize their more left-wing radical-democratic and (partly) 
socialist credentials only to take over and strengthen the oligarchic practices they 
criticized.51 Having to postpone indefinitely any flirtation with liberal 
parliamentarianism, Russian autocracy nevertheless participated in the same 
historical trend as a “well-ordered police state.”52 The oppositional liberalism 
developed here was itself propelled on a path of de-radicalization,53 the same 
predicament being shared by its Polish counterpart.54 From Germany55 to Japan,56 
                                                 
46 Richard Pipes, Struve, Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905, Cambridge, Mass., 1970; idem, 
Struve, Liberal on the Right, 1905–1944, Cambridge, Mass., 1980. 
47 Robin Okey, Eastern Europe 1740–1985: Feudalism to Communism, 2nd ed., London, 1989; 
Andrew C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of the Borderlands from 
Pre- to Postcommunism, Stanford, 2000. 
48 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, The Enlightenment East and West: A Comparative Perspective 
on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions, in Enlightenment, Nationalism, 
Orthodoxy. Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe, Aldershot, 1994, 
pp. 51–70; Ioannis Tassopoulos, The Experiment of Inclusive Constitutionalism, 1909–1932, in 
Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship, ed. by Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Edinburgh, 
2006, pp. 251–272. 
49 Andrew C. Janos, The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, Princeton, 1982. 
50 Idem, Modernization and Decay in Historical Perspective: The Case of Romania, in Social 
Change in Romania, 1860–1940. A Debate on Development in a European Nation, ed. by Kenneth 
Jowitt, Berkeley, 1978, pp. 72–116. 
51 Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria, 1878–1918. A History, Boulder, Colo., 1983; Gale Stokes, 
Politics as Development. The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth-Century Serbia, Durham, 1990. 
52 Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach, in “The 
American Historical Review,” 80, 1975, no. 5, pp. 1221–1243.  
53 George Fischer, Russian Liberalism: From Gentry to Intelligentsia, Cambridge, Mass., 
1958; Andrzej Walicki, Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of 
Nineteenth Century Russia, in “Russian Review,” 36, 1977, no. 1, pp. 1–45. 
54 Brian A. Porter, Democracy and Discipline in Late Nineteenth-Century Poland, in “The 
Journal of Modern History,” 71, 1999, no. 2, pp. 346–393; Maciej Janowski, Polish Liberal Thought 
before 1918, Budapest, 2004, pp. 147–218. 
55 James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, 1978; Dieter 
Langewiesche, Liberalism in Germany, Princeton, 2000. 
56 Douglas Howland, Translating Liberty in Nineteenth-Century Japan, in “Journal of the 
History of Ideas,” 62, 2001, no. 1, pp. 161–189. 
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the surge to freedom was calibrated – and partially falsified – in order to meet the 
demands of (relative) backwardness.  
It is against the background of the reigning statist modernizing liberalism and 
of the prevalent Zeletinist tradition that one can understand the full originality of the 
stance adopted, from its first issue, by the journal “Libertatea.” The opening article 
rejects communism and fascism in conjunction with a diffuse interventionist wisdom 
which sustains a widespread skepticism towards the ideas of economic and political 
freedom: “At present, the public is invited to subscribe, in turn, to the otherwise most 
opposite doctrines, from medieval-style corporatism to Asiatic bolshevism, not to 
forget fascist corporatism, statist economy and other interventionist utopias, at the 
cost of abandoning completely economic and political liberty. They are not only seen 
as outdated but are even held responsible for the terrible crisis the entire world is 
facing.”57 Chief-editor George Strat understands the drive away from classical 
liberalism as paving the road to dictatorial serfdom: “Statist and interventionist 
practices must be eliminated without hesitation, as it is through them that, without 
notice, society is set on the road to socialism and dictatorship.”58 A peculiar – and 
primitive – social psychology is found at the roots of the interventionist disease, to 
the same extent as liberalism is depicted as the underlying psychology of genuine 
modern social life: “To the mechanistic conception, which stays at the basis of any 
system of statist economy and which can only suit the barbaric and destructive mind, 
civilized world has to oppose the conception of an organic economy, that, for the 
time being, cannot be given a better name than liberalism.”59  
Although contributing all throughout primarily with pragmatic commentaries 
on internal and foreign politics and on domestic and international economic 
developments, and never eulogizing individualistic values in the same fashion as 
the other collaborators, I.P. Gigurtu, the funder and director of the publishing 
enterprise, nevertheless tackles from the beginning the delicate issue of the relation 
between politics and economics,60 in order to make clear afterwards – however 
occasionally – his dissatisfaction with the statist perversion of capitalism, found by 
him as strongly connected with the spread of an anti-capitalist opinion. The 
bourgeois class itself is guilty of this, in so far as, facing the disruptions brought by 
the economic crisis, its members “joined forces with the interventionist state 
policies.” This is because “they liked to see the state first covering a part of their 
losses, and then granting them large benefits at the cost of falsifying the capitalist 
regime, based on free competition. It is because of such policies that a negative 
stance towards capitalists gained ground. Later, this stance was extended to the 
capitalist system itself, the two notions being easily mistaken for each other.”61 
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No matter how pathetic “Libertatea”’s defense of liberalism against both 
internal and international enemies might have looked like over its first five years – 
inaugurated at the very moment of the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, in 
January 1933, and followed by three years of increasing concessions and growing 
accommodation to domestic authoritarianism, from the beginning of 1938 to the 
end of 1940 –, the attempt of Dumitru Drăghicescu to vindicate, against the 
classical liberal comeback promoted by Strat and his associates, a rightly balanced 
ratio between the demands of individual freedom and the need of containing the 
damaging effects of unqualified economic individualism sounds even more 
impressive in the circumstances. Arguing in the footsteps of an exchange between 
Strat and peasantist Mihai Ralea62 – the latter criticizing the stance of “Libertatea,” 
from a sociological standpoint, in the journal “Viaţa românească” –, Drăghicescu 
tries, once again, to cut a middle way between socialist temptations and bare liberal 
capitalism. Briefly recalling the changing fortunes of the combat between free trade 
economy and statist policies on the European scene, he explains that Manchesterian 
liberalism led to the monopolistic falsification of free enterprise, and state 
interventionist policies were then required precisely in order to protect 
individualistic values: “Excessive individualism provoked the reaction of the social 
principle, that manifested itself in the guise of monopolist practices, harnessed to 
the service of either particular persons or of associations. It is in this way that 
liberalism worked for its own annihilation, leading to the creation of medium and 
large enterprises which, by taking advantage of propitious situations, grew into 
gigantic shareholder companies. Under their influence, individualism was 
eventually socialized, being regimented into syndicates and cartels. […] 
Interventionism was then called upon precisely as an instrument for the protection 
of the individual freedom and of free enterprise, its task being that of ruling out or 
at least lessening the monopolistic pressures placed upon them. It was in this way 
that the social principle acted to the very benefit of individualism.”63 
While Strat established a connection between insidious interventionist 
prejudices and thriving political tyranny in a way strongly reminiscent of the 
arguments later advanced by Friedrich Hayek regarding the socialist temptations as a 
springboard for totalitarianism,64 Drăghicescu’s understanding of the perverse effects 
of nineteenth century Manchesterian economy can be claimed on behalf of Karl 
Polanyi’s opposite view (delivered at the same time as Hayek’s), which traced back 
interwar political authoritarianism to the long-term effects of unhindered economic 
individualism.65 This Romanian anticipation of a classical disagreement on the causal 
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connection between economics and politics was not broadened in “Libertatea.” When 
restating his case66 – in continuation to his long-standing reflections, informed by 
Durkheimian theorizing, on the relation between individual “agency” and the 
constrains of social “structure” in human developments, in order to ponder the scope 
of determinism as part of a right approach to the intricacies of social life67 –, 
Drăghicescu provoked a brief rejoinder of Strat,68 which, on all accounts, abruptly 
closed the debate. Even unaccomplished, the discussion in question can still display 
fresh meanings when revisited with a new hindsight. An attempt to disclose precisely 




Before engaging with the project of re-infusing a democratic cast to local 
liberalism and infusing it with welfarist ideals, Drăghicescu got immersed, at the 
time of the First World War and the peace settlement, in the politics of nation 
building, taking an active part as a diplomat in the creation of Greater Romania.69 At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, his nationalist vision was formulated in the 
language of historical social psychology, in the best known of his books (and the 
only one that exercised a significant influence on Romanian culture over the long 
run, up to the present).70 The work is a belated restatement of the variety of 
nationalist thinking sustained by an unqualified drive to westernization that so much 
characterized late Enlightenment and early nineteenth century liberal discourse all 
throughout Eastern Europe.71 In the same way as his predecessors of the 1848 period 
in Romania and the surrounding countries of the region – for which Russian 
Decembrists acted as paradigmatic anticipators72 –, Drăghicescu pleads the cause of 
modernization on the western pattern with a determination that is only matched by 
his eagerness to disclose old virtues – deeply inscribed in the local cultural texture – 
likely to act as an engine for catching up with the advanced nations. It is this that sets 
him apart from contemporaries with a related ideological orientation, but inclined to 
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explain modernization as resting almost entirely on cultural imports taken against a 
quasi-amorphous traditional social and cultural background.73 
Sometimes conjoined with Romantic-conservative74 or with socialist75 
stances, westernizer nationalism has acted as one of the most clearly cut features of 
modernizing liberalism in non-western – and particularly East-European – 
contexts.76 It does not follow from this, however, that it could not take slightly 
different forms within the various (sub-)streams of the ideological trends of the 
kind. The Romanian record here surveyed provides good testimonies to this extent. 
While Drăghicescu argues his case for westernization by (seemingly) ignoring the 
traditionalist culture in the course of being shaped at the time in the country, 
Zeletin starts his journey as a political writer precisely by confronting the stark 
reality of a Romanian westernizer-traditionalist divide. His pamphlet entitled From 
the Land of the Donkeys of 1916 looks like an exercise in critical distancing from 
both camps (maybe animated by a harsher attitude towards the latter).77 After a 
short and dubious flirtation with precisely that kind of traditionalist culture,78 he 
then moves on to adopt his characteristic stance of giving an unqualified support to 
that brand of nationalist discourse which was meant to support nation-building 
policies – on the basis of economic protectionism yet fully within the framework of 
the expanding world capitalism – while at the same time rejecting wholeheartedly 
anti-modern nationalism of Romantic progeny, predicated on agrarian nostalgias 
and on an organic understanding of the national culture.79 His interventions in 
“Dreptatea socială” give voice to the same argumentation.80 
Although the National Liberal Party had always subscribed only reluctantly 
to the (somewhat too cynical) Zeletinian rationalization of its policies81 – and some 
of his dissident leaders even contributed occasionally to “Libertatea” in order to 
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argue for a half-way departure from the same policies and from their ideological 
reinforcements82 –, the discourse of Zeletin could obtain a significant following in 
the late 1930’s.83 Of still much greater influence was, however, its corporatist 
progeny, revolving around the figure of Mihail Manoilescu. Disentangled from the 
same “neoliberal” stance of the early 1920’s that was defended by Zeletin84 – and 
sustained, at the time, by much the same kind of opposition to the peasantist left-
wing ideology and democratic rhetoric85 –, the corporatist doctrine came back full 
circle to its original inspiration in the 1940’s – after a long-term involvement with 
Carolism and a protracted relation with local fascism – by the means of an attempt 
to entrench itself in Romanian history taken as an exercise in historical sociology 
betraying its indebtedness (however critically) to Zeletinian thinking.86 It is 
significant that, no matter how much it tried to enlist on its side the traditionalist 
nationalist and legionary-fascist rhetoric of the “organic state,”87 the discourse of 
Manoilescu never fully relapsed into a celebration of anti-western and nativist 
values88 in the same way as fascist social-political and economic thinking.89 This is 
certainly telling of the inner nature of its liberal modernizer ideological core. 
Unlike the democratic liberalism of Drăghicescu – claiming on its behalf the 
legacy of 1848 but hardly aware of the already strong heritage of anti-
“fortyeightism” at the turn of the century –, the anticipators of “Libertatea”’s free-
trade doctrine that contributed to the two series of the journal “Curentul nou” – in 
1905–1906 (at Galaţi), and then in 1920 (at Bucharest, where the other two 
periodicals surveyed here were also issued) – initially defined themselves precisely 
by opposition to the growing culture of indigenist nationalism.90 Unlike the 
supporters of Zeletin and their corporatist descendants, however, they extended this 
opposition towards the modernizing nationalism employed by the Romanian ruling 
oligarchy – and the Liberal Party leadership specifically – for legitimating policies 
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of economic growth “by ourselves alone.” When recalling, in 1920, his 1905–1906 
venture (and broadening his criticism of “populist” traditionalism such as to cover 
– misleadingly in the main –, alongside the right-wing brand originally targeted, 
the left-wing version issued from the agrarian populism of Russian revolutionary 
inspiration91), H. Sanielevici thus underscores that “[early twentieth century] 
populism was nothing more but a complot of our neo-feudal and protectionist-
driven oligarchy against the industrialization of the country, that is against the 
independent bourgeoisie,” in order to make clear afterwards: “It was in the name of 
this bourgeoisie that my protests were voiced at the time.”92 
Leaving aside the early and rapidly classicized formulations of protectionist 
economic thinking,93 anticipations of the “neoliberal”-corporatist trend had already 
been put forward at the moment the rejuvenated “Curentul nou” was clarifying its 
stance,94 and influences of this way of thinking did pervade the pages of the 
journal. Arguing for “neoliberalism,” a collaborator thus starts by distinguishing 
between two extreme theoretical positions taken with respect to economic policies: 
“A first extremist stance is that of individualism, with its two faces, namely 
orthodox liberalism and anarchism. […] Another extremist view is that of statist 
interventionism, with its two incarnations: imperialism and socialism.” After thus 
clearing the ground of erroneous creeds, the author introduces his own vision of an 
individualist-statist synthesis, that he presents as a (loosely defined) version of 
“solidarism”95: “In between these two extremes, we find the eclectic one: 
solidarism proclaims the right of the individual to the full exercise of his freedoms, 
while nevertheless maintaining that the community can only gain from the free 
expression of personal interests and from the broad development of individual 
energies. Having said this, it is important to underscore that the individual takes 
birth as a debtor to society. Hence, state intervention is necessary each time 
individual activity is ineffective, or stays at odds with the principle of solidarity.”96 
Against the theoretical basis delineated in this way, a directive for Romanian 
politics is set: “The new regime will be based on cooperation. […] As far as the 
state is concerned, it will act, most often, as the most important partner in the 
cooperative pursuits, having to encourage […] the various forms that cooperation 
might take.”97 
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Such a voice sounds, however, as a strikingly isolated one in the pages of 
“Curentul nou.” All throughout, the journal is dedicated to promoting the 
emancipation of free trade economic mechanisms from the constraints of 
interventionism, also making a sustained pleading for foreign capitals as a 
necessary cure to statist-based social inertia.98 The Romanian deviation from the 
developmental path of genuine liberalism is most often found as predicated on 
entrenched bureaucratization.99 Ştefan Antim takes a slight departure from this 
interpretation, by his theory – invoking the authority of the social-democrat 
Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea – that Romanian society suffers from the ills of 
neo-feudalism, with the National Liberal Party as the most prominent support of 
the syndrome.100 Framing his analysis in the footsteps of Gherea – always eager to 
emphasize, in a characteristic Plekhanovist fashion, the urgency of capitalist 
development and democratization over socialist revolutionary designs101 –, Antim 
explains how the agrarian reform of 1864 that abolished feudal arrangements failed 
to turn into agrarian capitalism. Instead, “the new bourgeoisie that the reform of 
Cuza created rapidly degenerated into an agrarian class, conjoining its landholding 
fortunes with its control over the levers of political power. When destroying the 
boyardom, the new agrarians indulged in a sustained hatred for the genuine 
bourgeoisie.”102 The law of the inalienability of peasant lands adopted in 
conjunction with the agrarian reform of 1864 and acting as a pillar of the neo-
feudal structures “stays in total contradiction to the very essence of liberalism.” 
When subscribing to these arrangements and taking advantage of them, “our liberal 
party erected a wide-ranging system that runs contrary to the demands of 
liberalism, a typical anti-liberal system.”103 
Once making thus his claim for true liberalism dependent on a pleading for 
genuine bourgeois-capitalist development, Antim proceeds then to argue that 
democratization itself – the undeniable watchword of the years immediately 
following the First World War – can only come after the Romanian society 
disentangles itself from the prevailing falsifications of liberalism and capitalism: 
“The emergence and consolidation of the bourgeois class is the real objective of 
democracy, of true democracy, which cannot arise and thrive in the narrow and 
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unfavorable frame of an agrarian state.” Such a development is easy to envision, as 
the Liberal Party will have to make appeal to bourgeois constituencies in the new 
conditions created by the introduction of universal male suffrage, accompanied by a 
redistribution of lands. Indeed, having seen their hopes of gaining the peasant 
electorate on their side thwarted – due to the fact that enfranchised peasants moved 
easily into the political folds of peasantism and nationalism –, “the liberals can only 
survive if they manage to adapt to the new situation, which they themselves created 
in fact. They will have to go to the towns, in order to find in that milieu their old 
supporters whom they expelled from the great agrarian holdings. We can be sure that 
our liberals will do this time what they should have always done: they will look for 
the support of the bourgeois class, of the independent and productive bourgeoisie.”104 
In “Curentul nou,” the pleading for classical liberalism was born in direct 
confrontation with the practices of mainstream modernizing liberalism, that were to 
receive, soon thereafter, the rationalization elaborated by Zeletin. In “Libertatea,” 
the theoretical defense of liberalism and individualism would greatly gain in 
sophistication, at the cost of dropping out expressions of explicit opposition to the 
liberal establishment. After joining the enterprise driven by Gigurtu and Strat, 
Sanielevici and Antim continued to broaden their criticism of bureaucratic 
parasitism,105 of protectionism and economic isolationism106 and of “neo-medieval” 
traditionalism,107 while abstaining from taking explicit issue with either the party 
staying in power up to December 1937 under the leadership of Gheorghe Tătărescu 
or, indeed, with Carol II and his camarilla (that Gigurtu himself would increasingly 
get associated with). Even when lessening the critical edge of their theories in this 
way, they nevertheless continued to envision national development as professed 




The exchange between Drăghicescu and Strat emerges retrospectively as a 
Romanian fragment of a world-wide and long-term confrontation between two 
traditions of liberal thinking and practice. At the time he refashioned it in order to 
counteract the attempt at a liberal-individualist revival of the journal “Libertatea,” 
the social thesis expressed by Drăghicescu from within broadly conceived liberal 
theoretical principles was being placed on sounder foundations by the Keynesian 
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revolution in economic theorizing.109 New Deal policies taking inspiration from the 
same new economic view were already being coined, in the United States, as a 
response to the intrinsic instability of the capitalist system that the economic crisis 
had made manifest. Large-scale extensions and full-blown applications of the same 
policies, in Western Europe and other parts of the capitalist world, came after the 
end of the Second World War.110 Despite the fact that it acted as an integral part of 
the Cold War international constellation, functioning in conjunction with 
reconstruction strategies designed to contain global communism, the welfare state 
agenda drawn on the basis of a left-wing understanding of liberalism took 
advantage of the anti-fascist consensus and of the interwar Popular Front 
tradition.111 Its demise in the late 1970’s, partly under the impact of new 
international pressures arising from the restructuring of the same Cold War 
framework,112 issued into a rejuvenation of precisely those deregulating economic 
practices that Strat and his associates envisioned in the 1930’s as a necessary cure 
for the entrenched ills brought about by the Romanian statist-driven economy. 
Continuously fed by an ingrained apprehension of any liberal concession to 
socialist ideals and objectives, the neoliberal view – canonized as the “Washington 
consensus” and strengthened by the breakdown of Soviet-style communism as a 
major ideological alternative to capitalism on a global scale113 – then reigned 
supreme up until the inauguration of a new economic crisis of capitalism.114 Critics 
of neoliberal practices underscored the importance of China’s refashioning of its 
economic-political system on the state capitalist model as an integral part of the 
(temporary) victory of right-wing liberalism over its rival,115 thus bringing to light 
the full relevance of older analyses of the Chinese deviation from the Russian (and 
East European) communist pattern, itself predicated on marked differences 
between centuries-long historical legacies.116 
Alongside their bare urge for a return to welfare-state ideals, such criticisms 
of the three decades of neoliberal ascendancy – installed in 1979, enhanced in 1989 
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and shattered in 2008 – also point to the need for reconsidering the theoretical 
bases of the socially-sensitive liberalism and the wider intellectual tradition staying 
behind it. Polanyi’s view of economic “embeddedness” – already hinted at above – 
thus went together with Keynesian economics as a theoretical reinforcement of 
left-wing policies predicated on broad liberal premises (despite its emergence – and 
unlike Keynesianism – from within the socialist tradition117). The (rather eclectic) 
“new liberalism” of the pre-Keynesian variety to the fold of which Drăghicescu 
belonged was rooted in a tradition stretching back across the welter of the 
nineteenth century democratic radicalism with Jacobin overtones, to the republican 
and radical Enlightenment tradition of early modern times.118 Hayek’s neoliberal 
alternative was elaborated, for sure, on neo-classical economic foundations already 
set at the end of the nineteenth century and refashioned by the Austrian school 
during the interwar era.119 Its economic theory and historical sociology were deeply 
intertwined with a revival of liberal conservative philosophical principles taking 
place against the background of totalitarian politics,120 but also staying in 
continuity to the liberalism of the Right forged in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution and indebted to the vision of moderate Enlightenment.121 How can we 
characterize the three Romanian liberal stances delineated so far by reference to the 
Left-Right historical divide thus disclosed within the larger liberal tradition? 
The ideological experiment of “Dreptatea socială” can firmly be placed on 
the side of Left-liberalism. Otherwise – and despite the fact that it can reasonably 
be vindicated as a Romanian contribution to the revival of classical liberal 
economics and liberal-conservative politics in the guise of the twentieth century 
neoliberalism –, the discourse promoted by Sanielevici, Antim, Strat and their 
associates is more difficult to be characterized as participating in the world-wide 
development of liberalism with a right-wing cast, when taking into account the role 
it performed as part of the Romanian ideological context. The collaborators of 
“Libertatea” took a (somewhat timid) critical stance towards the expanding culture 
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of fascism,122 while describing the prevailing “ideological confusion” of the age as 
evenly nurtured by false idols belonging to all parts of the political spectrum.123 
They sometimes adopted recognizable liberal-conservative overtones, harshly 
opposed to democratic demagogy.124 In a related fashion, they could argue that “the 
Right continues to be the Right,” while “the Left is not the Left anymore,” in so far 
as “it can only get embodied by following the ways of the Right.”125 Still, when 
contrasted with the Zeletinian conception streamlined on a path of evolution 
leading to the corporatist surge for a nationalist-authoritarian breakthrough, the 
voices of “Curentul nou” and “Libertatea” emerge as belonging together with that 
of Drăghicescu – and indeed with that of the social-democratic theory 
acknowledged by Antim as an inspiration –, as parts of a large oppositional camp 
that can loosely be described as left-wing, on local criteria. The view originated 
with Sanielevici around 1900 has always remained a minority variety of liberalism 
throughout the last pre-communist decades of Romanian history. Holding an even 
starker minority status in the interwar period, the liberal socialism that glimmered 
in “Dreptatea socială” relied on the memory of fortyeighter democratic radicalism,126 
itself an oppositional discourse at the time but which had nevertheless managed to 
accede to a position of prominence in the sphere of culture. Acting as a perverted 
inheritor of fortyeightism, the peripheral variety of “neoliberalism” defended by 
Zeletin occupied a solid mainstream position among the Romanian interpretations 
of the liberal view. 
The liberal heritage of Eastern Europe is almost entirely associated with the 
same view that received its best Romanian expression in the works of Zeletin.127 
By gradually disentangling themselves from communism, East European 
intellectual circles participated – in some countries of the region at least – to the 
cross-bordering elaboration of late twentieth-century neoliberalism.128 However, 
despite the fact that warnings against the conflation of the broader liberal vision 
with the narrower tenets of its neoliberal version alone were occasionally 
expressed,129 no sustained attempt to elaborate a historical typology of regional 
liberal politics and thinking has been advanced so far. The present paper was 
therefore intended as an effort to start filling this gap.  
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THE NATION OF THE WESTERNIZERS: MAINSTREAM AND MINORITY 
VARIETIES OF ROMANIAN LIBERALISM 
Abstract 
The article broadens a typological approach to the history of Romanian 
ideological development centered upon an approach of the same kind taken to the 
evolution of ideological liberalism in the pre-communist period. Focusing on the 
period 1900–1940 and on three periodicals of the time, it delineates two minority 
liberal discourses, alongside the mainstream one of modernizing liberalism with a 
strong statist and nationalist commitment, best incarnated historically in the 
practices of the National Liberal Party and having counterparts in all East European 
countries. The local typology thus disclosed is then related to the world-wide 
evolution of the main trends of liberalism over the long run. The study underlines 
that the existing comparative bibliography does not offer an appropriate 
understanding of the varieties of liberal theory and experience within the region. 
The article is intended to start filling this gap of the available literature. 
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